Showing posts with label reciprocity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label reciprocity. Show all posts

Wednesday, October 13, 2010

Robert Putnam. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy

Robert Putnam. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapter 6 (“Social Capital and Institutional Success”), particularly pp. 167‐185.

Cooperation amongst individuals requires trust. The trust is social capital that can be lent to individuals within the same social network in order to facilitate collective action. Forms of social capital, such as trust, social norms, and networks, increase with use and diminish with disuse. Personal trust translates into social trust in modern settings through the norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement. Horizontal networks are more conducive to solving collective action problems than vertical networks because subordinates are less able to punish a superior for defection.

Strategic behaviors of individuals are determined by the society in which they operate. Path dependence can produce durable difference in performance between two societies, even when the formal institutions, resources, and individual preferences are similar.

Social context and history condition the effectiveness of institutions. Building social capital is the key to making democracy work.

Saturday, October 9, 2010

Robert Putnam. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy

Robert Putnam. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapter 6 (“Social Capital and Institutional Success”), particularly pp. 167‐185.

Cooperation amongst individuals requires trust. The trust is social capital that can be lent to individuals within the same social network in order to facilitate collective action. Forms of social capital, such as trust, social norms, and networks, increase with use and diminish with disuse. Personal trust translates into social trust in modern settings through the norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement. Horizontal networks are more conducive to solving collective action problems than vertical networks because subordinates are less able to punish a superior for defection.

Strategic behaviors of individuals are determined by the society in which they operate. Path dependence can produce durable difference in performance between two societies, even when the formal institutions, resources, and individual preferences are similar.

Social context and history condition the effectiveness of institutions. Building social capital is the key to making democracy work.

James C. Scott. 1976. The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia

James C. Scott. 1976. The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press. Chapter 1 (“Introduction”).

The subsistence ethic is placed at the center of the analysis of peasant politics. The "safety-first" principle underpins many of the technical, social, and moral arrangements of precapitalist agrarian orders. Redistributive mechanisms in villages are a form of insurance where starvation is a real and present danger to all. Subsistence security and the subsistence ethic were socially experienced as patterns of moral rights or expectations; peasants should care more about what is left of their agricultural yields than what is taken.

The imposition of capitalism led land-owners to claim harvest based on what the market would bear rather than what the tenants needed. The total absence of any provision for the maintenance of a minimal income incited peasant protests.