James Fearon. 1998. Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation

James Fearon, “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation,” International Organization, 52, 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 269-305.

Summary by Adi

Background: Traditional cooperation theory suggests that different issue areas in international politics can be characterized by different strategic structures (for example, some cooperation issues can be modeled as a coordination game, while others may resemble the Prisoner’s Dilemma). In addition, a central claim of standard cooperation theory concerns international institutions and the shadow of the future: by providing a framework for regular and repeated interaction, channeling information to concerned parties, and lowering the transaction costs of monitoring, international institutions lengthen the shadow of the future, and thereby make cooperation more likely (since states with longer time-horizons will care relatively more about the future payoffs from cooperation, and since the prospect of extended interaction makes the threat of retaliation a meaningful deterrent to cheating).

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith. 2005. The Impact of Leadership Turnover and Domestic Institutions on International Cooperation

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith, “The Impact of Leadership Turnover and Domestic Institutions on International Cooperation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (5) (October 2005), pp. 639-660.

The differences in cooperation between two nations can be attributed to the domestic institutions of those nations if actors within a nation employ leader-specific punishment strategies. The leader of Nation A can punish the leader of Nation B for Nation B's non-cooperative policies by refusing to cooperate with Nation B until the leader is replaced. The citizens of Nation B will lose out on cooperative benefits and have an incentive to remove the non-cooperative leader. Then in cases where leader removal is easy, as in the case of large winning coalition systems such as democracies, leaders will have reduced incentives to defect and states can cooperate deeply. Instances of cooperation breakdown between such nations are rare. In contrast, when one of the nations attempting to reach agreement has a high cost for leader removal, cooperation is shallow. Instances of cheating lead to prolonged periods of non-cooperation.

Arthur A. Stein. 1982. When Misperception Matters

Arthur A. Stein, “When Misperception Matters,” World Politics 34, 4 (July 1982), pp. 505-526.

Summary by David

Question: What impact does misperception have on the occurrence of war?

Main point: [M]isperception does not always affect an actor's choices or determine outcome …when misperception does have such effects, it is in a narrow range of circumstances; and that misperception can lead to cooperation as well as to conflict

Robert Putnam. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy

Robert Putnam. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapter 6 (“Social Capital and Institutional Success”), particularly pp. 167‐185.

Cooperation amongst individuals requires trust. The trust is social capital that can be lent to individuals within the same social network in order to facilitate collective action. Forms of social capital, such as trust, social norms, and networks, increase with use and diminish with disuse. Personal trust translates into social trust in modern settings through the norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement. Horizontal networks are more conducive to solving collective action problems than vertical networks because subordinates are less able to punish a superior for defection.

Strategic behaviors of individuals are determined by the society in which they operate. Path dependence can produce durable difference in performance between two societies, even when the formal institutions, resources, and individual preferences are similar.

Social context and history condition the effectiveness of institutions. Building social capital is the key to making democracy work.

Samuel P. Huntington. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order

Samuel P. Huntington. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster. Chapter 1 §1‐2 (“The New Era in World Politics”); Chapter 2 §1 (“Civilizations in History and Today”); and Chapter 6 (“The Cultural Reconfiguration of Global Politics”).

A civilization is the broadest cultural identity. Civilizations evolve and endure.

Cultural identity defines a state's place in world politics, its friends, and its enemies. Modernization after the Cold War has reconfigured global politics along cultural lines. Cultural commonality facilitates cooperation and cohesion among people and cultural differences promote cleaves and conflicts.

Cleft countries bestride the fault lines between civilizations. A torn coutry has a single predominant culture which places it in one civilization but its leaders want to shift it to another civilization.

Robert Putnam. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy

Robert Putnam. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapter 6 (“Social Capital and Institutional Success”), particularly pp. 167‐185.

Cooperation amongst individuals requires trust. The trust is social capital that can be lent to individuals within the same social network in order to facilitate collective action. Forms of social capital, such as trust, social norms, and networks, increase with use and diminish with disuse. Personal trust translates into social trust in modern settings through the norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement. Horizontal networks are more conducive to solving collective action problems than vertical networks because subordinates are less able to punish a superior for defection.

Strategic behaviors of individuals are determined by the society in which they operate. Path dependence can produce durable difference in performance between two societies, even when the formal institutions, resources, and individual preferences are similar.

Social context and history condition the effectiveness of institutions. Building social capital is the key to making democracy work.