Literature Review: Balancing, Bandwagoning and Walt

• Walt, Stephen M. 1985. "Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power." International Security 9: 3-43.
• Walt, Stephen M. 1987. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Walt (1985, 1987) draws a contrast between balancing (allying against a threat) and bandwagoning (allying with the threat). He contends that balancing should be more common than bandwagoning and supports his contention with a survey of alliances in the Middle East. This conclusion is not surprising from the perspective of the argument here. Threats arise from differences in position on issues on which the threatening nation pursues change. Because alliances require agreement between the allies over some set of issues, nations will generally not ally with nations that threaten them for the lack of areas of agreement. Balancing alliances have the common interest in resisting the threatening nation to bring the allies together.

Bandwagoning alliances could form for two reasons: (1) because both parties face a common threat from a third nation or (2) because the threatening nation receives concessions to deactivate the threat. The former leads to a symmetric alliance; the latter, to an asymmetric alliance. An example of the former from Walt's 1987 cases would be Jordan's alignment with Egypt on the eve of the Six Day War. Balancing alliances can also be either symmetric or asymmetric. NATO is an example of an asymmetric balancing alliance.

From: Morrow, James D. 1991. "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances." American Journal of Political Science 35(4): 904-933.

Literature Review: Balance of Power and Power Transition Theories of Alliances, Morgenthau, Organski, Kugler, and Bueno de Mesquita

• Morgenthau, Hans J. 1973. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 5th ed. New York: Knopf.
  
• Organski, A. F. K. 1968. World Politics. 2d ed. New York: Knopf
• Organski, A. F. K., and Jacek Kugler. 1980. The War Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1988. "The Contribution of Expected Utility Theory to the Study of International Conflict." Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18: 629- 52.
• Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. 1972. "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820- 1965." In Peace, War, and Numbers, ed. Bruce M. Russett. Beverly Hills: Sage.

The balance of power and power transition theories of alliances argue for different conceptions of the fundamental role of alliances than the capabilities aggregation model and the security-autonomy trade-off model of alliances. In the balance of power theory (Morgenthau 1973), nations form alliances to offset growing powers and restore the balance. Alliances in a balance of power system should be nonideological and last as long as the immediate threat. This view is the capability aggregation model. Prospective allies are just capabilities that can be added through alliance, and once the threat to the balance has been countered, the alliance is unnecessary and should be broken.

The power transition theory (Organski 1968; Organski and Kugler 1980) postulates an international system dominated by one nation. This dominant state forms a large alliance from the lesser powers that share its ideology. Nations not in this satisfied coalition may form alliances dedicated to the overthrow of the existing international system. Alliances in a power transition system should be ideological and long-lasting.

From the perspective of the argument of this paper, the theories are both correct and incorrect because, as Bueno de Mesquita (1988, 641-42) points out, they make different assumptions about the distribution of capabilities in the system. Balance of power theory assumes an international system composed of a number of major powers with relatively equal capabilities. The role of minor powers is ignored because they do not possess sufficient capabilities to shift the balance of power. In the international system postulated by balance of power theory, only symmetric alliances can be formed because all possible allies have equal capabilities. Alliances are formed only to gain security (i.e., nonideological) and do not persist because they are symmetric. Power transition theory, however, assumes a system with one dominants tate holding a preponderance of power. Any alliance that the dominant state forms is asymmetric. (Symmetric alliances are those in which both allies receive security or autonomy benefits. Asymmetric alliances are those in which one ally gains security and the other autonomy.) Alliances in a power transition system are formed to advance the autonomy interests of the dominant state or challenger (i.e., ideological) and persist because they are asymmetric.

Both theories are right in the sense that given their assumptions about the international system and their focus on relations among equals or between the dominant state and all others, their conclusions about alliances follow. However, widening our analysis of alliances shows that those conclusions are not general. The argument presented in Morrow (1991) also explains why both theories should be able to find supporting evidence in the historical record. Scholars generally see the nineteenth century as a balance of power period, while the power transition model fits the twentieth century better (e.g., Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey's 1972 results on the effects of systemic concentration of capabilities on war). The alliances examined in Morrow (1991) reflect this observation; symmetric alliances are formed more frequently in the nineteenth century (26 symmetric alliances versus 16 asymmetric alliances) than in the twentieth century (62 to 60). But in both centuries, asymmetric alliances last longer on the average than symmetric alliances.

From: Morrow, James D. 1991. "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances." American Journal of Political Science 35(4): 904-933.

Literature Review: Arms Race and Michael Horn

• Horn, Michael Dean. 1987. "Arms Races and the International System." PhD dissertation. Rochester, NY: Department of Political Science, University of Rochester.
• Richardson, Lewis F. 1960. Arms and Insecurity. Pacific Grove, CA: Boxwood Press.
• Huntington, Samuel P. 1958. "Arms races: prerequisites and results." Public Policy 8: 41-86.
• Wallace, Michael D. 1979. "Arms races and escalation: some new evidence." Journal of Conflict Resolution 23: 3-16.
• Morrow, James. 1989. "A Twist of Truth: A Reexamination of the Effects of Arms Races on the Occurrence of War." Journal of Conflict Resolution 33(3): 500-529.

Horn (1987) offers an independent means of determining when two countries are engaged in an arms race. His relatively straightforward measure has two qualifications for definition as an arms race. First, that the growth rates of a country's military expenditures are on average higher in the period preceding a dispute than in the whole period under study (for him, the Correlates of War period from 1816 to 1980). Second, in order to be classified as an arms race, the growth rate must be higher in the second half of the period than in the first. In this, he attempts to include the criterion of acceleration which is so vital to the Richardsonian distinction between stable and unstable arms races (Richardson, 1960, pp. 74-75). Only when growth is speeding up or seemingly out of control is there an arms race.

He finds that of longer arms races (he looks at Huntington's twelve-year period, cf. Huntington, 1958) over one-half end in war (Horn, 1987, p. 56). Experimenting with a shorter time period, Richardson's suggested six years (Richardson, 1960) yielded no significant relationship. He concludes from this that an arms race over the longer period is indicative of a continuing conflict of interests and/or hostile relationship between countries, but the shorter measure could easily catch incidental or shortterm conflicts that never reach the level of war.

He determines that arms races are considerably rarer than others have thought, but they do have some relation to the escalation of disputes to war, though his findings are less robust than Wallace's (Horn, 1987, p. 60; Morrow, 1989, p.502).

From: Sample, Susan G. 1997. "Arms Races and Dispute Escalation: Resolving the Debate." Journal of Peace Research 34: 7-22.

Literature Review: Tinderbox Hypothesis, Michael D. Wallace, Paul F. Diehl, and Mike Horn

• Wallace, Michael D. 1979. "Arms races and escalation: some new evidence." Journal of Conflict Resolution 23: 3-16.
• Wallace, Michael D. 1982. "Armaments and escalation." International Studies Quarterly 26: 37-56.
• Diehl, Paul F. 1983. "Arms races and escalation: a closer look." Journal of Peace Research 20: 205-212.
• Horn, Mike. 1984. "Arms races and the likelihood of war." Presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, GA, March 27-31.

Wallace (1979, 1982) presented the first attempt to develop a comprehensive list of arms races and test the arms race hypothesis. He constructed his list of arms races by examining the military expenditures of participants in serious disputes, specifically those involving at least a threat to employ force prior to those disputes. Wallace's arms race index attempted to capture not only the growth in military expenditures of an arms race but also the underlying conflict between the racing parties by searching for arms races prior to serious disputes. However, this procedure would miss any arms race that did not end in a serious dispute, and consequently cannot provide a complete test of the arms race hypothesis. Instead, Wallace tested whether arms races made escalation to war more likely, or what could be termed the "tinderbox hypothesis." The tinderbox hypothesis states that arms races do not necessarily cause wars, but they do create an inflammable situation between the racing nations where even the slightest spark can

push a blaze to war.

Wallace found impressive results supporting the tinderbox hypothesis: 23 of the 28 disputes preceded by an arms race escalated to war. However, Wallace's determination of arms races and his accumulation of the results suffer from two methodological flaws: His arms race index may have been misleading, and he decomposed multilateral disputes into separate dyads (see Weede, 1980; Altfeld, 1983; and responses by

Wallace, 1980, 1983).

Diehl (1983) and Horn (1984) reanalyzed the tinderbox hypothesis using the same data as Wallace but different arms race indices, and without decomposing each dispute into separate dyads. Both required both sides' average growth in military expenditures to exceed certain thresholds over a set period of time prior to the dispute. Dichl (1983) found that only 3 of 12 disputes preceded by an arms race escalated to war. Horn (1984) found that at most 60% (9 out of 15) of 6-year arms races and 46% (6 out of 13) of 12-year arms races ended in war. These reanalyses suggest that the tinderbox hypothesis is only partially true; disputes preceded by arms races do escalate to war more often than other disputes, but they do not overwhelmingly escalate to war.

From: Morrow, James D. 1989. "A Twist of Truth:  A Reexamination of the Effects of Arms Races on the Occurrence of War."  Journal of Conflict Resolution 33(3): 500-529.

James D. Morrow. 1999. The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and Negotiation in International Politics

James D. Morrow, “The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and Negotiation in International Politics,” in Lake and Powell, Strategic Choice, pp. 77-114.

Summary by Taylor

Main Point: Both strategic settings and preferences determine actors’ choices, and the choices of many actors determine outcomes.  Since the choices of other actors affect the final result, an actor cannot simply chose a course that will lead to its desired outcome.  From this, three different strategic problems (among others) arise: signaling, commitment, and bargaining. Understanding domestic politics is necessary to understanding strategic choice.