Arthur A. Stein. 1982. When Misperception Matters

Arthur A. Stein, “When Misperception Matters,” World Politics 34, 4 (July 1982), pp. 505-526.

Summary by David

Question: What impact does misperception have on the occurrence of war?

Main point: [M]isperception does not always affect an actor's choices or determine outcome …when misperception does have such effects, it is in a narrow range of circumstances; and that misperception can lead to cooperation as well as to conflict

Question: What impact does misperception have on the occurrence of war?

Main point: [M]isperception does not always affect an actor's choices or determine outcome …when misperception does have such effects, it is in a narrow range of circumstances; and that misperception can lead to cooperation as well as to conflict

Assumptions:

1.)    [M]isperception can only matter in relations between interdependent states. If states are independent of one another-in the sense that one actor's decisions do not affect another actor's pay- offs-then misperception is irrelevant.

2.)    [T]he belief that misperception is important necessarily implies that international politics is a variable-sum game. [Misperception cannot matter in… situations [in which one actor's gain comes at another's expense]; it can only matter in relation- ships that combine elements of cooperation and conflict.

3.)    The argument that misperception affects an actor's decision presumes that the actor has a choice… Indeed, national leaders may not have choices because of structural or systemic constraints, or because of their own cognitive processes. But if they see themselves as having only a single course of action, then their assessment of the intentions and preferences of others is moot[.]

Definitions:

1.)    Dominant strategy: an actor with a dominant strategy has a course of action that it intends to pursue regardless of what the other actor does.

2.)    Contingent strategy: an actor with a contingent strategy’s preferred course of action depends on what the other actor does:

A.) a reciprocator wants to cooperate if the other actor cooperates, defect if the other defects
B.) an opportunist wants to cooperate if the other defects, defect if the other cooperates.

Arguments:

I.     Misperceptions do not matter when both actors have a dominant strategy: Consider the following game:

		Actor B
		Cooperate	Defect
Actor A	Cooperate	(C,C) Compromise	(C,D)B gets it way
	Defect	(D,C) A gets it way	(D,D)War

		Actor B
		Cooperate	Defect
Actor A	Cooperate	(2,2)	(1,4)
	Defect	(4,1)	(3,3)

(the numbers represent ordinal rankings of the actor’s preferences)

Basically, this is a version of chicken in which both drivers have a great deal of confidence in their airbags; each would rather stay in the road while the other swerved, but each would also rather crash than swerve, regardless of whether the other driver swerved or stayed in the road.  In this game, one or both actor’s misperceptions  of the other’s intentions will have no impact on the outcome (crash!), because each actor intends to stay in the road regardless of what the other does.

I. Effects when a contingent actor’s misperception that the other has a dominant strategy when it in fact also has a contingent strategy

1.)    A contingent actor’s misperception that the other has a dominant strategy when it in fact also has a contingent strategy will only result in war in two situations:

a.) One of them occurs when the misperceiving actor is a reciprocator who mistakenly believes that the other has a dominant strategy of defection when, in fact, it too is prepared to reciprocate.

b.) In the second case of misperception that results in otherwise avoidable mutual defection, the misperceiver is an opportunist who believes the other actor to have a dominant strategy of cooperation (when it in fact is a reciprocator).

2.)    It is important to note that one actor's misperception of another as having a dominant strategy can also facilitate the avoidance of war and mutual defection. The misperception transforms a fluid situation in which there is either no equilibrium outcome or two  equilibria into one with a single equilibrium; it provides a clear course of action for a misperceiver with a contingent strategy.

a.)    When a reciprocator misperceives another reciprocator as a cooperator. The potential outcome of mutual defection is avoided and the misperception facilitates the occurrence of the outcome of mutual cooperation.

b.)    When an opportunist wrongly perceives another [opportunist] to be bent on defection, its misperception ensures the certain avoidance of mutual defection by frightening it into cooperating.

II.      Outcome when an actor with a contingent strategy’s misperception that the other has a contingent strategy when it in fact has a dominate strategy.

		The misperceived actor actually has a dominant strategy of:
		Cooperation	Defection
The misperciever actor’s strategy is:	Opportunist	Outcome should be DC: misperceiving actors sees no-equilibrium world or “chicken” world of two equilibria	Outcome should be CD: misperceiving actors sees no-equilibrium world or “chicken” world of two equilibria
	Contingent	Outcome should be CC: misperceiving actor sees no-equilibrium world or “tit-for-tat” world	Outcome should be CC: misperceiving actor sees no-equilibrium world or “tit-for-tat” world

 

III.    Effects of Mutual Misperception:

MUTUAL MISPERCEPTION
		Actor B
		B has a dominant strategy	B does not have a dominant strategy
Actor A	A has a dominant strategy	A believes B does not, B believes A does not, NO EFFECT	A believes B does, B believes A does not, POTENTIAL DISASTER
	A does not have a dominant strategy	A believes B does not, B believes A does not, POTENTIAL DISASTER	A believes B does, B believes A does, FACILITATES COORDINATION

Conclusion: One cannot, therefore, conclude that misperception causes conflict simply because it occurs in crises that result in war. Misperception may be coincidental to-rather than determinative of-the occurrence of war, because war can be an equilibrium outcome that results from specific configurations of actor preferences. Even if misperception does sometimes play a causal role in the outbreak of war, its impact is situa- tionally circumscribed. It is certain, therefore, that if one limits the em- pirical study of misperception to crises that do result in war, one ensures an inaccurate assessment of the overall impact of misperception in international relations.